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In this paper we examine managed service in the information and communication
technology (ICT) sector, characterized by the polarization between an infrastructure
service that is growing in scale and increasingly becoming a commodity and
customized or even one-of-a-kind projects. We refer to the approaches taken by three
highly innovative advanced service companies, IBM, Ericsson, and Cable & Wireless, to
package and deliver ICT service on a more industrialized basis. We identify the six-
stage process that describes their journeys to date. We also describe some of the
challenges they faced on that journey as well those currently facing them as they move
to a higher degree of industrialization. To address these challenges, we propose a
model with three axes: offering development, service delivery, and go to market. The
model demonstrates how the increasing industrialization of managed service requires
an approach integrating all three of these dimensions. We also show that strong
governance is required to address the impacts of technological evolution, marketplace
dynamics, and corporate culture.
INTRODUCTION
In a classic paper, Peter Drucker proposed that the
greatest management challenge facing developed
economies in the twenty-first century is to raise the
productivity of knowledge and service workers.
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In
this paper we ask, Why is it that advanced
technology firms are so adept at industrializing the
manufacturing of their products, but so challenged
by packaging and industrializing the delivery of
managed service? There is a seeming paradox in
that, while the high-technology sector struggles with
this, more traditional service sectors, such as
hospitality, entertainment, and travel, are able to
deliver highly industrialized service: they provide
their clients with predictable functionality and
quality, increase their operating efficiency, and
improve their market coverage characteristics
through franchising and licensing.
From Pizza Hut to McDonald’s, the Ritz-Carlton to
Walt Disney World, and British Airways to easyJet,
customers and clients expect—and for the most part
receive—a service that is designed to minimize
surprise and is essentially the same almost any-
where on the globe. This does not mean that every
customer receives similar or identical service; the
service offered by these companies is often highly
configurable—from potentially thousands of choices
of meals from the individual food options at
McDonald’s to a wide variety of hotels, rooms, and
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service options within, say, the Accor hotel group.
And each client’s experience (the way they view the
service delivered) will be highly personalized with
both carefully orchestrated as well as spontaneous
staff interactions.
In contrast to the modular approach of the tradi-
tional service sector, the information technology
(IT) managed-service sector is almost entirely
bespoke (i.e., custom-made). By managed service,
we refer to the practice of transferring responsibility
of day-to-day IT management to an external service
provider to improve operational and cost effective-
ness. While there is clearly a place for highly
tailored service, the extent to which service contin-
ues to be individualized and labor intensive rather
than asset-based is surprising in view of the
maturity of this industry. It also inhibits the
exploitation of IT managed services by small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) whose need may
be greater than larger enterprises.
We begin by examining the different categories of
service and how they relate to the technological and
market capabilities of firms. We then explore how
vanguard companies, such as IBM, Ericsson, and
Cable & Wireless (C&W) are seeking to productize
their service offerings and industrialize their service
delivery. By productize, we refer to the packaging of
the service offering as a predefined series of modules
or a unified offering to the clients; by industrializing,
we refer to the service provider’s approach to its
production and delivery. We describe a six-stage
evolutionary process being adopted by advanced
service firms to make improvements in the areas of
strategy, organizational structure, operational pro-
cesses, and commercial model. This process begins
with the provision of bespoke solutions as these
companies hone their capabilities and it ultimately
ends by exploiting a large proportion of service
components that are replicable and can be rapidly
reconfigured to meet each client’s specific needs.
Finally we describe a triple-axis conceptual frame-
work to help firms embarking on this process. We
compare the approaches taken by our three study
companies with more traditional service industries
in order to identify what they have in common and
what one sector might learn from the other.
This research methodology is based on in-depth
collaboration with C&W and Ericsson during the
period May 2000 to July 2003 as part of a study of
five international companies and an in-depth anal-
ysis working with IBM Global Services, EMEA
(Europe, Middle East, Africa) between 2003 and
2005. This was an interview-based case study
method that examined the companies’ strategic
decisions and motivations and it involved inter-
views with 100 CEOs, directors, senior project
managers, heads of functional departments, and
project managers. It included feedback sessions with
each firm and a joint verification workshop with all
five companies. This work was published in the
spring of 2006.
2
The analysis was subsequently
updated with direct practitioner involvement and
analysis of the IBM experience of productizing and
industrializing the delivery of its managed services
in EMEA. In December 2006, the IBM case study and
findings were validated and developed further
through interviews with the IBM Vice President then
responsible for that project and the offerings
executive leading the work. The case study at C&W
was also updated at that time, following in-depth
interviews with the C&W Vice President, Partner
Programmes, responsible for C&W hosting and
managed-service offerings. (The case studies of IBM,
Ericsson, and C&W referred to in this paper and
which provide a basis for many of the observations
and conclusions should be read as companion
pieces. They may be consulted on the Web.
3
)
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF MANAGED SERVICE
Products are industrialized by developing standard-
ized and repetitive processes and by creating
products that are composed of modular components
(componentization) which form a platform of
interdependent core and complementary products.
However, firms have experienced difficulties in
achieving similar improvements in the service
sector. Some firms, such as IBM, are attempting to
improve their service productivity and innovation
by emulating the systematic and replicable ap-
proaches found in product development. Yet little is
known about how firms turn the different services
they offer from ad hoc, one-of-a-kind assignments
into repeatable and scalable processes; what specific
managerial approaches are developed to package,
simplify, and reuse service offerings; and whether
techniques developed for manufacturing can be
easily transferred to the service sector.
It is well known that the service sector strives to
industrialize its offerings where appropriate to
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improve the performance of a particular service, by
substituting technical solutions for service workers
(automation), or standardizing service processes.
According to Levitt,
4
service can be industrialized
using hard, soft, and hybrid technologies:
! Hard technologies and physical processes can
replace people, e.g., an automatic teller machine
replacing a bank clerk or an airport X-ray
surveillance system replacing manual checks by
airport security staff
! Soft technologies involve carefully planned in-
dustrial systems and procedures that can replace
individual service operatives, e.g., self-service
restaurants replacing the wait staff in cafes and
diners
! Hybrid technologies combining hard and soft
technologies can be implemented together to
improve the order, efficiency, and speed of service
provision, e.g., computer-controlled logistics
But the industrialization of service varies consider-
ably across industries depending on the volume of
output as well as the market structure and charac-
teristics of the service provided. It is useful to revisit
the product-process matrix (PPM) developed by
Hayes and Wheelwright.
5
The PPM shows how
product and process capabilities interact over time
and provides a way of understanding the industri-
alization of service in different industries. While the
PPM was initially used with manufacturers, Hayes
and Wheelwright also applied it to service indus-
tries. Figure 1A depicts its application to the food-
service business. It shows that the service sector
spectrum is similar to manufacturing process and
product stages.
Service can only achieve advances in productivity
comparable to high-volume manufacturing process-
es if technologies are employed that produce
reliable, rapid, and low-cost service. High-volume
service companies, such as Burger King and
McDonald’s, have successfully adopted technologies
from mass production to provide a standardized
menu of service in high volume at low cost.
However, such technologies cannot be easily ap-
plied to provide bespoke service in low volumes or
service on individual projects in order to meet the
varying needs of individual customers. Fast-food
chains operate in an almost continuous flow model
to produce highly standardized services, while fine
dining restaurants operate on a job shop or craft
basis to cope with the highly specific needs of each
customer.
Schmenner developed a similar model showing how
service firms move diagonally within a service-
process matrix.
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In his inversion of the PPM,
improvements in productivity are gained by moving
from the bottom right (high customization and high
labor intensity) to the top left quadrant (low
customization and low labor intensity).
In this paper, we use Hayes and Wheelwright’s
framework to emphasize that productivity im-
provements in IT services, as in other, more
traditional services such as food and retailing,
depend on movements toward higher-volume pro-
duction and increasingly standardized outputs. Our
revised version of the PPM incorporates one-of-a-
kind projects that provide high-value bundles of
products and service as integrated solutions tailored
to specific customer needs.
7
The customer is no
longer simply buying a product or service, but is
purchasing the expectation of benefits the solution
will provide over time, such as an operating
chemical plant or telecommunication system.
8,9
This framework helps us to better understand both
the service and the process capabilities required to
deliver an integrated product and service offering.
Figure 1B shows the matrix populated with managed
services for IT and communications. We can see that
service ranges from customized, one-of-a-kind solu-
tions to high-volume and highly standardized
service. Each of these categories requires a different
delivery model, and these models align well with the
production process models in the Hayes and
Wheelwright framework and the core capabilities of
the firm. As we move from the lower right-hand
corner to the upper left of the figure, the nature of
knowledge moves from being highly standardized
and codified (enabling replicable modes of service
production, even the franchising of service busi-
nesses) to becoming much more dependent on
customized processes and tacit knowledge—that is,
the knowledge, insights, and professional expertise
known by single individuals. The appropriability
(the ability to capture the returns that accrue from
innovative activity) of this codified knowledge is
low, while the dependence on tacit knowledge
creates both cultural and practical challenges in
terms of productizing offerings or industrializing
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their delivery (see Chesbrough and Spohrer
10
). This
represents a major challenge for a service business as
it seeks to industrialize its capabilities while con-
tinuing to differentiate its offerings competitively.
Firms whose goal is to compete on cost leadership
and market focus can seek to improve their offerings
within a given quadrant in the matrix rather than by
changing their position within the matrix.
Figure 1
Product and process matrix: (A) Hayes and Wheelwright model showing food service industry, 
(B) showing convergence of professional service and telecommunications operators
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Staying in the comfort zone
Firms have a tendency to remain centered within
particular cells in the matrix, essentially their
comfort zone, even as they innovate and bring new
offerings to market or find new ways of producing or
delivering them. Drawing on resource-based theory
and organizational capabilities, we can see that
there are significant obstacles to firms that attempt
to shift their positions. However, competitive
pressures, the emergence of new technologies, or
market shifts will induce firms to improve their
performance by moving diagonally to the bottom
right of the matrix. Later, we review how this
occurred in the three study companies, and how
their success was not always complete.
The resource-based view of the firm (for example,
Penrose,
11
Teece et al.,
12
and Grant
13
) shows that
the profitable expansion of the firm within its
existing technology and market base is underpinned
by improvements in productivity driven by the
increasing specialized or product-specific use of
resources.
11–13
This approach emphasizes the im-
portance of capabilities (that is, the distinct skills
and knowledge required to organize and perform
activities) to the competitive survival and success of
the firm. Following Penrose’s original approach, we
distinguish between the technology and market base
(or capabilities) of the firm, the latter referring to the
understanding and insights of the firm in relation to
market requirements and its ability to engage its
resources to bring its offerings to market. In our
context of service, we identify three domains of
technological capability:
! Service-delivery competence or production-pro-
cess competence as it relates to service
! Portfolio development
! Market management competence
It is the combination of these technological elements
that ensures the reuse, repeatability, and ultimately
the replicability of a portfolio of service.
Although much of the organizational capabilities
literature refers to individual firms, managed-service
solutions are often designed and delivered by a
number of firms working in partnership or as
subcontractors to a prime contractor, as well as in
combination with the client’s own resources. Thus,
a number of service systems must be considered,
depending upon the position of a firm in the matrix.
By service system, we refer to the value cocreation
configuration of people, technology, shared infor-
mation, and value propositions connecting internal
and external service systems.
14
When we refer to the
capabilities of a firm, we do so in this context, as
well as including its capability of acting as the prime
contractor and selecting suppliers and partners with
complementary capabilities to deliver the overall
service solution.
Firms may develop new offerings to reflect emerging
or even maturing market requirements for specific
offerings, but if the service-delivery organization, its
technological base, its processes and, what is
equally important, its culture are grouped at one end
of the spectrum in the matrix rather than the other,
our conceptual framework suggests that the firm
will struggle to transform itself in order to deliver
these offerings competitively. Achieving this may
require a further technological shift or the acquisi-
tion of another company that brings complementary
competencies.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS AND IT
SERVICES FIRMS: CONTRASTING CAPABILITIES
Telecommunications operators such as BT Group,
Telefo´nica, C&W, and Telecom Italia were early
entrants into the managed-service market with IT-
infrastructure hosting services, business-application
hosting (such as office systems, sales force auto-
mation, and enterprise resource planning) and other
managed-service offerings linked to data communi-
cations offerings (such as virtual private networks,
voicemail, voice over Internet Protocol, teleconfer-
encing and videoconferencing).
Two hallmarks characterized their approach. First,
their existing strength was in predominantly asset-
based offerings—and their assets were physical
rather than intellectual. Second, they offered service
that could be provisioned on an almost automated
basis and was delivered within an assembly-line-like
model. They complemented this automation with
the involvement of some personnel to wrap the core
technological capability with a service dimension for
the offering.
Meanwhile, IT and professional service firms, based
on a bespoke, high-value service model, find it more
challenging to move to a more industrialized
approach. Their business models are far less asset
intensive; their solution-design and delivery pro-
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cesses as well as the decision gates and criteria do
not sit comfortably with high-volume batch or
assembly-line processes, and the culture of their
management and professionals is entirely different
from that of telecommunications operators.
Figure 1B depicts how these two sets of actors are
extending their scope toward a middle ground.
EVOLUTION OF MANAGED SERVICE CAPABILITIES
WITHIN THE FIRM
In this section we explore the evolution of capabil-
ities to develop, deliver, and market managed
service and we introduce the six-stage process to
achieve greater service productivity through indus-
trialization. Although each stage is described in
turn, there are many feedback loops in the process;
it is not a simple, linear journey. At the end of this
section, we illustrate these stages in practice.
Stage 1: Learning
In the case studies,
3
we see that strategic opportu-
nities most frequently arise from tactical responses
to customer needs. While strategy departments may
appear to be the torch bearers lighting the path to
new markets, firms rarely follow their lead until a
degree of institutional learning has taken place. The
learning may be the result of a specific customer
request or ultimatum, or a competitor taking market
share. Sometimes a new entrant brings an entirely
new business model or capability and takes a
significant share of the client base of a firm. The
strategy department could perhaps be described as
undertaking exploratory learning to develop new
approaches to service offerings and delivery.
Whereas exploratory learning focuses on breaking
with established routines, experimenting, and cre-
ating new approaches to a problem, exploitative
learning is about developing the resources, capabil-
ities, and organizational structures required to
perform routine, standardized, and repetitive pro-
cesses.
15
Exploitative learning that leads to sus-
tained improvements in service-business
performance requires the firm to reach the tipping
point in its willingness to exploit this learning. Our
research suggests that this tipping point may be the
result of external forces or the appointment of a new
chief executive or business leader.
IBM first entered the systems-integration market and
then the outsourcing business in response to specific
customer opportunities and demands. Kodak want-
ed someone else to take on the operation of its IBM
mainframe computers so that it could concentrate
on its core business. Who better to do it than the
company that had sold them to Kodak in the first
place? The institutional learning sometimes comes
as an epiphany to company executives when they
finally understand what their market analysts and
strategists have been recommending for some time.
This is the learning stage, and it is rapidly followed
by market analysis of opportunities, gap analysis
around capabilities and competencies, investment
analysis on the resources and assets needed to
exploit the opportunities, and risk analysis of the
likelihood of success and the costs of failure.
Stage 2: Capability building
In the capability-building stage, the firm assembles a
set of capabilities and competencies. It may redirect
existing ones and add resources to address the
market. Alternatively, and often to complement its
own resources, a firm may form swift and often
loosely coupled relationships with one or more third
parties that can supply the required capabilities and
resources.
A current executive may be appointed as the leader
of a new business area, or some recruitment may be
involved. However, the actual resources needed to
supply the new service and those responsible for
selling it are likely to remain in the established field
and service-delivery organizations. To start the
business, existing revenue streams are sometimes
recategorized under the new business line and
corporate communications repaints as much of the
business as possible under the new banner. This is
often evident when a company needs to be seen as
being in the vanguard of new business sectors.
The leader and perhaps a small leadership team are
made accountable for this new business area, but
are unlikely to be directly responsible for the
resources needed to execute the task. Thus, to
whatever level of matrix management was already
in place, another dimension is added.
Starting a new business line implies further
learning; salespeople assigned to the area will be at
the bottom of the new learning curve, and initial
sales productivity is unlikely to be high. As sales
increase, though, it will engender resistance in
large companies because established business-line
owners will claim that the new line is cannibalizing
their business and that it might even be threatening
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strategic relationships with key clients. When field
personnel look to their current sales incentive
plans, they may be reluctant to volunteer for a
sales area with lower productivity and they may
not want to be the first to participate in the
learning curve in the hope of satisfying this new
demand. Their behavior can be likened to the
response of antibodies surrounding an invasive
cell. A former American Express executive, who
joined IBM early in the Lou Gerstner era, referred
to it as ‘‘death by duck bite.’’ Our experience and
case study research suggests that initial leaders in
new business areas often fall by the wayside, and
only the second or third person to take the job
eventually prospers in it.
Stage 3: Organizational restructuring
At this point in the process, the new executive
leading the business line will demand a dedicated
go-to-market team. This is the beginning of the
customer-facing front end of the organizational
restructuring stage and involves the formation of an
integrated go-to-market team made up of existing
field operatives or people specially recruited from
other firms who have experience in similar or
related service business. This is the first wave of
organizational changes. The go-to-market team,
often driven by a specialized sales incentive plan,
may include business development, sales, technical
sales support, marketing communications, bid sup-
port, and administration. At this initial stage, the
team is unlikely to have a dedicated service-delivery
organization behind it, and the executive responsi-
ble may not have any direct control over the
resources responsible for delivering the service to
the customer.
Thus, the service-delivery organization may have
different motivations and goals, and its performance
measurements may run directly counter to the goals
set for the new business line. Service-delivery
organizations will be focused on resource utiliza-
tion, gross margins, return on assets, and compli-
ance. With the introduction of a new service, there
will be unpredictable levels of demand, and there
may be productivity and quality challenges that will
negatively affect most of the key measures of the
service-delivery organization. If the service is
offered on a global basis, those resources are likely
the responsibility of powerful regional executives,
which adds another level of complexity.
Stage 4: Resource dedication
As sales and delivery volumes build, it becomes
possible to dedicate resources within the service-
delivery team and build centers of competence
around specific components of the service.
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Those
components can become the focus of continuous
refinement to improve quality and service-delivery
productivity. This is the start of the resource
dedication stage.
With dedicated service delivery and go-to-market
teams, we see the emergence of a far more self-
contained business line, and it is at this stage that
the drive to industrialize the service portfolio
accelerates. Initially, capabilities and competencies
were shaped into relatively large components that
can be configured to support the needs of specific
customers. However, this is not industrialization.
These components may be categorized and appear
in proposals and promotional materials as distinct
and modular offerings, but that is not the reality.
Each customer may require a different configuration
of these components; the components may be
insufficient, requiring the addition of certain other
services; some components may need to be modi-
fied; and the components may not be very well
defined.
Thus, the sales team will require a combination of
technical sales and service delivery to support each
bid; individual bids will need to be costed, priced,
and assured; and the cycle time for delivering a
proposal and adjusting it to the customer’s evolving
requirements—both during the bid process and
post-sales—will be lengthy and complex and may
give the impression that the team is unresponsive to
the customer. This is also expensive for the firm
making the bid. Once the customer decides to move
forward, service provisioning is difficult to auto-
mate, reporting becomes highly customized, and
service quality and productivity is unlikely to benefit
from scale effects. It also tends to foster a splintering
of localized resources, which were good at handling
their own unique components. The components that
are required will often have emerged through
happenstance based on local conditions rather than
through a strategic design process.
Stage 5: Rationalization
Rationalizing a portfolio involves analyzing the
available managed service components from differ-
ent lines of business, removing overlapping ones,
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filling the gaps, and, where appropriate, adapting
the ones that remain in order to optimize the range
of end-to-end solutions that can be configured from
those components, and then ensuring that those
solutions align with the marketplace and the
evolving needs of the client and that they are
competitive. It is a process that is typically led by a
cross-disciplinary team or by an executive with deep
practical experience with both customers and
service delivery go to market—and there are big
payoffs for both. If this individual has experience in
the product development side of the business, then
the concepts of productizing solutions for manu-
facturability, ease of configuration, and custom-
ization will add greatly to the process of
industrializing the service offering. Rationalization
takes three forms. The first concerns the offerings;
the second is related to how offerings are delivered
(the opportunities for automation and creation of
centers of competence for specific service compo-
nents); the third involves the sales process by
automating proposals using granular, standardized
components that are pre-costed, market priced, and
pre-assured, both individually and in combination.
When IBM Global Services decided to rationalize its
e-business Hosting* service, a team of more than 50
people worked for approximately six months ratio-
nalizing the service portfolio across more than a
dozen countries taking the very best examples. They
created over 700 individual components and for
each one, they developed a service specification for
proposals, a detailed statement of work that would
be included in the contract schedules, and service-
delivery descriptions, which informed the service-
delivery function of exactly what was involved in
the provisioning and delivery of that service
consistently across geographic areas and service-
delivery centers. They introduced a much higher
level of automation in those centers, with common
tooling to support service delivery. Not only was the
number of service centers halved, most were
assigned a specific competency, such as SAP
application management and server and storage
infrastructure operations. Also, using remote man-
agement capabilities, the various service-delivery
centers responsible for the various competencies
could be located wherever was most cost-competi-
tive. For example, server management for UNIX**
servers was located in Brno, Czech Republic, and
management of SAP applications was located in La
Gaude, France. Rationalization occurred not only in
terms of offerings, but also in the approach to
delivery, the assets involved, and the physical
distribution of resources.
Stage 6: Transformation
The final stage in the process is transformation. We
might consider all six stages adding up to a
transformation in the way a firm can package and
deliver services. However, in this stage we refer to
the ability of the firm to transform the nature of its
entire offering portfolio and create new capabilities
that anticipate market and individual client needs,
enabling it to become a market leader.
Transformation becomes possible because each
center of competence can focus on the best
technologies for enhancing its capabilities. This can
be compared to the designers of a Formula One**
car, who take both a holistic and a component view
to ensure, for instance, that the aerodynamics,
braking system, and power train are best in class
and that they use the very latest technology so that
the car as a whole performs to the highest levels.
This same approach is followed by each center of
competence in a service-delivery function. It gener-
ally leads to the emergence of a strong design and
portfolio management group that is able to engage
with a dedicated service-delivery team to continu-
ously enhance or create new offerings.
Finally, in achieving more modular, easy-to-config-
ure, and standardized service, the sales function can
now look to new channel-delivery models, diversi-
fying its route to market and reaching new customer
sets.
TRIPLE-AXIS MODEL
From the description of the six-stage evolutionary
model, it would appear that the path to industrial-
izing managed service should be smooth. However,
as the examples show, the process is challenging,
and there is no unequivocal evidence that the goal is
achievable. There are a number of forces at work,
including cultural issues that inhibit progress, highly
dynamic markets, and rapid technological change.
This combination of forces makes it much more
difficult to achieve the relatively steady-state model
that some of the more traditional service sectors
enjoy.
There are three distinct functions in the managed-
service business. However, particularly at the
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outset, these functions may not be reflected in the
organizational structure because individuals or
teams may perform one or more of these activities.
We have described the front-end go-to-market
teams, service delivery, and the development and
management of the service-offering portfolio. In
each case study we see the evolution of and
interaction among these three communities. When
firms first enter new business areas, they generally
appoint a figurehead to lead a virtual organization,
perhaps with virtual offerings, while the organiza-
tion digests the emergence of this new business line.
The individuals selling the service may also be
responsible for its delivery.
Although one may be able to depict the concept of
an entire portfolio of offerings on a chart or by
placing headings on the Web site of the firm, each
client receives a customized service whose scope
and nature may differ depending on the individual
delivering it. Service specifications and statements
of work may be relatively well developed, while
service-delivery descriptions may not be formalized.
In the six-stage process, it can be seen that over time
the responsibilities for these three functions or
pillars of the business—go to market, portfolio, and
delivery—are likely to separate organizationally and
become more formalized as sales volumes increase.
As the number of engagements grows, it creates an
opportunity to develop repeatable service offerings
and to take advantage of emerging economies of
scale.
However, this division of labor often reflects a
division of culture, exacerbated by fast-moving
markets and a rapidly changing technology land-
scape. We can think of the three pillars as the three
points on a triangle whose sides are represented by
pressures of markets, technology, and culture
(Figure 2). At the heart of the triangle, balancing
these pressures and stopping the triangle from
fracturing, is the governance model.
Bridging the cultural differences
Generalizing from the case studies, IBM in particu-
lar, we can see that the go-to-market team works
with the offering-development team to shape a
portfolio of service that reflects its clients’ needs and
competitive pressures. The delivery organization
looks for new tools and techniques that will allow it
to improve its productivity and, in its turn, is driven
by a combination of this productivity goal coupled
with quality objectives to componentize its capa-
bilities for easier reconfiguration and more consis-
tency in delivery. Similarly, the rapid entry of new
technologies into the market (for instance, Linux**
and open-source software offerings and 3G mobile
data communications and wireless broadband so-
lutions) means that it is necessary for the delivery
organization to rapidly develop new competencies
and capabilities to deliver newly developed offerings
in the service portfolio.
Finally, driven by a highly client-focused sales
culture, the go-to-market team will be trying to find
innovative offerings to differentiate them from their
competitors and looking for better ways to engage
the client. It will want to avoid protracted or
inflexible sales cycles and may see the service-
delivery organization as responsible for such rigid-
ities.
The go-to-market team aims to lower the costs for a
highly process-driven organization with repeatable
offerings, but also strives for an organization that
does not constrain them in terms of the timing or
content of their response. When looking to sell new
solutions to an established client, any problems
related to service delivery on a current contract are
likely to create significant tensions between the
parties.
Whereas in the traditional service industries there is
considerable crossover of resources between deliv-
ery, service development, and customer-facing
client-management organizations, this is unlikely to
Figure 2
The triple-axis model
Portfolio Delivery
Go to Market
Technology
CultureMarkets
Governance
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occur in the high-technology sector. Go-to-market
and sales resources are unlikely to have originated
in the service-delivery organization, while, for
example in the service industry, a manager at a hotel
may have worked his or her way up through the
organization. As Daniel Chaffraix, Country General
Manager, IBM France, pointed out: ‘‘The service
product managers are seen as a breed apart. . . . We
will find that they are no more likely to move to the
service-delivery function than the sales team.
Similarly, the sales team may consider them
bureaucratic, pedantic, and imply that they are only
in portfolio management because they struggled in a
direct customer facing role. These cultural differ-
ences are almost tribal, with little crossover except
at the very top of the business where, say, the
service-delivery executive may have led large go-to-
market teams or even, say, the finance function.
Service product managers need to be able to think in
two dimensions—selling and delivering—and keep
the balance between the two.’’
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A common complaint from delivery organizations is
that the componentization of service leads to
automation and commoditization of service, thereby
diminishing their role. In their view, interpreting a
customer’s requirements and fashioning a bespoke
service to meet it is a more intellectually challenging
role than reconfiguring pre-assured, packaged ser-
vice components, printing the service-delivery de-
scription scripts, and executing them. In the
execution of scripts, the focus is on process
compliance rather than personal judgment or an
individual contribution. Such a service model
implies the ability to use contractors or other third
parties to execute these basic tasks.
Competitive cost pressures drive the componenti-
zation and provision of repeatable service and the
exploitation of economies of scale. The result can be
remote delivery from lower-cost offshore or near-
shore service-delivery centers. However, individuals
involved with the delivery function may strive to
retain their personal value-add by attempting to
maintain a strong bespoke content, which relies on
their personal competence for delivery. Thus,
conflict arises as the offering development teams
seek more industrialized, component-based, re-
peatable service offerings, while the individuals
delivering the service want to see their roles
continuing and act to avoid being replaced by casual
or offshore resources.
Finally, metrics can be the cause of major culture
clashes. We describe later in the section ‘‘Market
and user-centric approach’’ how easy it is to
encounter differences in perspective. The focus of
the service-delivery organization is on compliance
with service-level agreements (SLAs), cost optimi-
zation, and trade-offs with flexibility. However,
managing client satisfaction is more complex than
meeting SLAs and key performance indicators, as
go-to-market teams are quick to point out.
Thus, the three pillars of the business emerge as
separate groups with little crossover in resources
and with each group motivated by different values
and metrics:
! Go to market—Client focused, flexible, differenti-
ation, orientation to sales cycle and sales produc-
tivity; key metrics include win rate, contract
value, margin, return on investment, and client
satisfaction
! Portfolio—Innovation in offerings, concern with
market fit and coverage, keenly aware of compe-
tition; key metrics include the value of and
proportion of sales using standardized compo-
nents, gross margin of offerings, market share
! Delivery—Innovation in delivery systems and
methods, concerns with skills, asset deployment
and management resource utilization; key metrics
include gross margin, SLA compliance, produc-
tivity and utilization rate, return on assets
deployed
Strong and empathetic governance is required to
manage the incipient cultural, technological, and
market pressures that affect them all.
Technology and importance of innovation
Continuous innovation is the reality faced by
providers of high-technology managed services.
Delivery resources are highly mobile and often
employed on a short-term contractual basis. Docu-
ments such as service-delivery descriptions and
statements of work are as mobile in practice as the
people who execute delivery. Our research suggests
that only when the methods of provisioning a
service and then delivering it are embedded in
proprietary tools can any degree of competitive
differentiation be sustained. However, if the tools
are proprietary, the customer will be reluctant to
commit its business operations to them. Conversely,
if the tools are industry standard, then any unique
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methods would be contained in scripts that are as
mobile as the human resources.
This creates a conundrum in trying to industrialize
service delivery. As Chaffraix explained, ‘‘Whenever
something can be scripted and automated, then it
will rapidly be commoditized too, and gains in
competitive differentiation are swiftly eroded. This
implies a commoditization of most basic managed-
service functions, so you must continuously en-
hance them to stay ahead or treat them as a platform
for more customized offerings.’’
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This logic had
been applied to all IBM infrastructure layers of
service hosting up to the application layer, including
SAP and Microsoft Exchange. Thus, there are two
forces at work: the need to continuously innovate in
the way a service is delivered to maintain compet-
itive costs and the need to continuously create new
service offerings to stay ahead of the competition
and add a highly customized layer to the basic
modules to provide an appearance of customization.
There are two approaches to sustaining a service
model (Table 1). In the first approach, a firm can
employ a high degree of automation by which it can
increase the scale of assets required to deliver a
competitive service, thereby creating a hurdle for
smaller companies and new entrants to the market.
In addition to automation, it can continuously
incorporate new, add-on service offerings. This is
very much the model that pertains to the telecom-
munications sector, which continuously adds on
residential and very-small-business service offer-
ings. The second approach is to innovate in the basic
delivery and packaging of core service components
while adding highly customized capabilities for each
client. If business slows, however, margins will
erode; the trick is to constantly incorporate client-
specific innovations to the core service offerings.
Market and user-centric approach
Traditional service sector firms seem better able to
industrialize their service offerings than do high-
technology firms because there is a crucial differ-
ence in their perspectives. In high-technology
industries, capabilities are assembled to address
customer needs, and product-like service offerings
emerge that are subsequently honed by the delivery
organization for greater efficiency. Solution manag-
ers on the go-to-market teams use their best efforts
to configure existing capabilities in order to solve
client problems or portfolio managers assemble
existing capabilities into prepackaged service offer-
ings.
In contrast to the high-technology industries, sectors
such as hospitality, entertainment, and travel do not
start by designing service offerings; instead, they
start with what they see as their challenge—
designing a client’s experience. The service offering
and capabilities they will subsequently need result
from the design of that experience. Whether this is
the check-in experience at an airport or hotel, a
retail shopping experience, or a financial transaction
online on in person, it is the experience itself that is
the focus of the design team’s efforts. Designing an
Table 1 Two approaches to sustaining a service model
Approach 1 Approach 2
Characteristics Highly standardized
Rapid cycle of new service introduction
Asset-based and scale
Dependent or disruptive technologies
Tightly defined with little or no customization
Automatic provisioning
Self-care and Web-based support
(Approach 1 is typical of telecommunications sector)
Mix of assets and resources
Standardized components plus bespoke layer
Personalized by client
Slower cycle for new service introduction
Competency rather than asset dependency
(Approach 2 is typical of IT sector)
Examples Web-server hosting
Microsoft Exchange on demand
Groupware—Lotus Notes
salesforce.com
SAP or Siebel as a managed service
Mid-range and mainframe hosting
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experience for the client that delivers value and
deciding which competencies and assets need to be
configured and what type of innovation is required
seems to be the right way of looking down the
telescope. Staring the wrong way down a tele-
scope—by assembling competencies rather than
designing experiences—creates the types of prob-
lems that are endemic in the high-technology sector.
For instance, a customer may agree to service levels
with an average response time or a level of systems
availability, and the delivery organization will
rigorously measure itself against these levels.
However, if at the end of the month a telecommu-
nications operator is unable to process invoices
worth billions of dollars on time, or a retailer’s
point-of-sales system stops functioning when there
are about 5,000 potential customers in the store, or a
hotel booking system fails and conference attendees
cannot be checked out, it is of little importance to
these clients that the service delivery met the
performance measurement of average availability or
response time for that month or quarter.
It is the customer’s experience that is of prime
importance in such cases. The examples described
are all real, and have had dire consequences. In each
case, service delivery was comfortably meeting its
commitments, but the client-facing team was
obliged to wrestle with failures in expectations. One
party was involved in managing the client; the other
was managing a contract and its SLA. Looking down
the wrong end of the telescope, particularly for
business-critical managed service, is a cultural,
operational, and organizational issue. The division
of labor and apparent distance from the customer
exacerbates an issue that is, at its core, simple:
Service design should be based on designing the
customer experience, not componentizing and re-
configuring competencies to address business and
operational problems. Such an approach is incom-
plete and lacks the flexibility needed to address the
unique and evolving demands of every client. Pine
and Gilmore
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suggest that experiences are as
different from services as services are from prod-
ucts. An experience is more than simply a service
that has been wrapped around a physical product. It
is a combination of services and products (such as
interactive games, product design simulators, and
virtual reality) that are designed to create a
memorable event for an individual customer. In
Table 2, we highlight some of the key differences
between the traditional service sector and IT
managed service with regard to the points raised in
this section.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown how three vanguard compa-
nies are moving toward more productized service
offerings and industrialized delivery, with differing
levels of success. We identified a six-stage journey
from the inception to the creation of a fully formed
new business line and highlighted many challenges
along the way. We discussed some of the differences
between the high-technology sector and the more
traditional service sector. We showed that the
journey toward productizing managed service and
industrializing its delivery is challenging; whether
the goal is both achievable and sustainable appears
uncertain. The implication of our analysis is that
efforts must be made, even if the end point is always
just over the horizon.
The core challenges would appear to be cultural,
technological, and competitive, as reflected in our
Table 2 Key differences between the traditional service sector and IT managed service
Characteristic Traditional Services Sector High-Technology Industries
Offering development Client experience led Competency led
Offering structure Integrated Component plus bespoke
Issue management Client satisfaction Contract compliance
Intra-organizational culture Frequent crossovers Tribal with little crossover
Performance indicators Hybrid, includes soft measures Hard, SLA based
Technology landscape Complementary Disruptive
Competitive landscape Fragmented New entrants
Globalization impact Local delivery Remote delivery
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triple-axis model. The rapidly changing technolog-
ical landscape offers the opportunity to automate
existing service, but the competitive and market
requirements for service evolve just as rapidly.
While the basic service offered can be standardized
to keep pace with competitive cost pressures,
innovative clients are demanding new capabilities,
which can only be offered through more bespoke
and personalized offerings that require going be-
yond the reconfiguration of standardized compo-
nents and call for innovation by the service
provider. In addition to these challenges, there is a
cultural issue that effects the pillars of the organi-
zation. It impacts not only the way managed
services are delivered, but also how they are
conceived and built. This is achieved too frequently
by assembling competencies rather than designing
end-to-end customer experiences. While both ap-
proaches are consistent with a compliance culture,
the first complies with the execution of the
prescribed processes while the second seeks to
comply with the goal of delivering the customer
experience, which makes it more likely to be a
source for future innovation.
The implication is that firms can mitigate the
cultural and organizational issues and improve their
offerings by imitating the more traditional service
sector and focusing on the development of custom-
er-experience-led rather than competency-based
offerings. However, the nature of technological
change in high-technology industries and the rapid
evolution of customer needs mean a bespoke service
layer on top of more commoditized components will
continue to be an important strategy for higher-
value-added managed service.
The alternative to this model is to move to a higher
degree of automation and standardization to allow
the firm to exploit the benefits of scale or to
introduce a disruptive technology such that it is
difficult for a new entrant to compete, and then to
incorporate new add-on service offerings continu-
ously. This is very much the model in the
telecommunications sector with residential and
very-small-business service offerings and it is the
model for firms such as salesforce.com, which offers
a highly packaged sales-force automation solution.
In these cases, the offerings can be very tightly
defined, the system boundaries are narrow, and
customers are not seeking differentiation per se, but
rather see it in terms of a tool, with differentiation
arising from how they apply it within their business.
Service delivery can be productized and industrial-
ized as long as the system boundaries are narrow
and the service itself is tightly defined, but to stay
ahead, constant innovation and the exploitation of
economies of scale are required, which do not easily
coexist. The most commonly employed strategy,
exhibited by the study companies, is to exploit
existing capabilities and intellectual assets, comple-
ment these with a layer of client personalization
and, wherever possible, optimize repeatable and
standardized core components of the service. While
both of these approaches are valid, they are only
likely to be successful when a strong multidisci-
plinary governance process is in place that can
bridge cultures, move flexibly to accommodate
technological change, and respond rapidly to market
shifts.
We began by referencing Peter Drucker’s paper,
‘‘The New Productivity Challenge.’’ He described
four key drivers for productivity: defining the task;
concentrating work on the task; defining perfor-
mance; and forming a partnership with the people
who are to become more productive. These all play
crucial roles in developing an effective portfolio of
services and developing a more industrialized
approach to service delivery. However, the success
of such an endeavor must also take into account the
end-to-end supply chain, including the go-to-market
process and its resources. And additionally, it will
depend on a strong multidisciplinary governance
process that can bridge the differences in culture,
organization, and performance metrics of the teams
responsible for developing the service portfolio,
taking it to market, and delivering the service.
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